United Nations election supervision in South Africa? Lessons from the Namibian peacekeeping experience by Diehl, Paul F.
sProgram in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
607 South Mathews Street
ACDIS DIE:2. 
1992 
OCCPAP 
ACDIS Library
Occasionai Paper
Urbana ÍL 61801 217/333-7086 ,
United Nations Election 
Supervision in South 
Africa?: Lessons from 
the Namibian 
Peacekeeping Experience
Paul F. Diehl
Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and 
International Security and 
Department o f Political Science
and
Sonia R. Jurado
Department o f Political Science
February, 1992
Paul F Diehl is associate professor of political science and a faculty member m the 
Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of 
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is co-author of Territorial Changes and International 
Conflict (1991) and editor of Measuring the Correlates o f War (1990) The Politics o f 
International Organizations (1989) and Through the Straits o f Armageddon (1987) as well as 
the author of over thirty articles on peace and security affairs
Sonia Ro Ju rado  is a Junior majoring in Political Science at the University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign
LIBRARY O F THE 
UNIVERSITY O F ILLINOIS 
AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
NOTICE According to Sec 19 
(a) of the University Statutes 
all books and other library 
materials acquired in any man 
ner by the University belong to 
the University Library When 
this item is no longer needed 
by the department it should 
be returned to the Acquisition 
Department, University Library
United Nations Election Supervision in South Africa9 Lessons from the 
Namibian Peacekeeping Experience1
Paul F Diehl and Soma R Jurado
They (South Africa) used Namibia as a dress rehearsal fo r what s happening in South Africa 2
Introduction
As the Cold War concludes and long standing regional conflicts dissipate there are also signs of change in 
South Africa The release of Nelson Mandela from prison the relaxation of apartheid laws and proposals for 
elections from the de Klerk government signal the beginning of a process by which majority rule will be 
established m South Africa Although one can clearly see the endpoint of the process (although not exactly fix 
its time) it is less clear whether the transition will be peaceful or marred by violence Most likely democratic 
elections will be the key event that establishes majority rule In our view it is also likely that the United 
Nations will be called upon to supervise those elections much as they did when Namibia gained its 
independence from South Africa In this essay we explore the Namibian peacekeeping experience of the United 
Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) with an eye to understanding how the triumphs and failures of 
that operation could reoccur m South Africa.
There are several implications of this analysis First unless the peacekeeping strategy is applied properly 
in South Africa, the goals that the process was designed to achieve may not be met This means that a bungled 
operation may prevent South Africa from having truly democratic elections and widespread violence could be a 
regrettable consequence The chances for the long term stability of the southern African continent may be 
jeopardized.
Second the lessons drawn from the Namibian experience apply not only to South Africa, but also to other 
applications of U N election supervision as well In the new world order the United Nations will be called 
upon to act as a neutral arbiter in several internal conflicts There are already at this wnting plans for U N  
supervision of elections in Cambodia and the Western Sahara The potential pitfalls we note for the use of 
peacekeeping troops for election supervision in South Africa are similar to those that would be encountered in 
those two areas and elsewhere Finally we offer some suggestions on how traditional United Nations 
peacekeeping operations must be modified to meet the new responsibilities occasioned by election supervision
We begin discussing why U N  supervision of South African elections is highly probable We then specify 
the tasks likely to be be performed by U N  peacekeeping troops relying in part on the precedent of the 
Namibian operation We then assess the major problems encountered by the Namibian operation and how these 
might be relevant for the South African case (and by implication to other instances of U N election 
supervision) Finally we offer some guidelines on how a South African peacekeeping operation might be 
improved to meet those challenges
1 Support for this research was provided by the Summer Research Opportunities Program at the University of Dlinois
at Urbana-Champaign The authors would like to thank Edward Kolodziej and Stephen Cohen for their comments 
and suggestions
2 This was a quote by a South African agent, Nico Basson, operating m Namibia See Ex Soldier for Pretoria
Describes Namibia Plot New York Times 1 July 1991 p 4
3 Paul Diehl and Chetan Kumar Mutual Benefits from International Intervention New Roles for United Nations
Peace Keeping Forces Bulletin o f  Peace Proposals 22 4 (1991) 369 375
2Peacekeeping in South Africa7
Although there is as yet no formal transition agreement4 providing for the monitoring of initial free elections in 
South Africa there are several reasons to believe that one is not far away and more importantly for the purposes 
here that the United Nations is likely to be charged with election supervision First, the parties to such an 
agreement will not rely merely on the good faith of the other signatories The de Klerk government will surely 
not want the African National Congress (ANC) to monitor balloting in black homelands Similarly black 
groupings will find unacceptable the idea that the extant South African government be responsible for ensuring 
the fairness of the election Indeed the ANC has noted in the 1989 Harare Declaration that the role of the 
international community in the transition process will be a subject for negotiation with the de Klerk 
government5 The mistrust is also prevalent within racial groups various black and white factions respectively 
in some cases are as hostile to one another as they are to different racial groups It seems conceivable that a 
transition agreement would include some provision for external supervision of those elections
Second if external monitoring of the election is to occur it is implausible that a regional organization 
would perform the task The logical grouping to handle the job would be the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU) There are few other suitable organizations on the African continent. The OAU experienced a miserable 
failure m its only attempt at peacekeeping in Chad more than a decade ago The OAU has neither the 
experience finances administrative machinery or perhaps even the willingness to perform another peacekeeping 
operation Even if supplemental assistance were provided by the United Nations or the European Community 
for example it is unlikely that the white South African government would allow the OAU to implement a 
peace accord an organization of primarily black African states with a history of animosity toward the white 
government is hardly the ideal neutral party in the eyes of the de Klerk government.
Third while it is conceivable that some multilateral arrangement led perhaps by the United States or 
Britain could supervise the elections it is more likely that those two states and most of the internal parues in 
South Africa will insist that the United NaUons be the implemennng agency No other grouping has had any 
experience in the kind of election supervision necessary Furthermore the Namibian precedent means that there 
will be increased international pressure for the United Nations to be mvolved in the transition process Even the 
de Klerk government may overtly favor U N supervision as it will know what to expect based on what 
happened in Namibia One might anticipate then that the ultimate agreement between the de Klerk government 
and the black factions will include a provision for U.N supervision for elections much as Resolution 435 
outlined the basic terms of agreement in Namibia.6
Peacekeeping Duties in Election Supervision
Traditional peacekeeping operations have a very limited set of duties First and foremost, peacekeeping troops 
are charged with monitoring cease fire arrangements and deterring violations by acting as an interposition force 
separating the combatants ' This is normally achieved not through force of arms (peacekeeping troops are only 
lightly armed and can use military force only in self-defense) but through moral suasion and physical 
separation Peacekeeping troops are also often charged with supervising the withdrawal of forces and weapons 
from designated areas Reports of violations or questions of compliance are usually handled by some 
conciliation mechanism with the disputing parties and the United Nations participating
4 For an analysis of how a democratic government in South Africa might be designed, see Donald Horowitz A
Democratic South Africa Engineering in a Divided Society Berkeley University of California Press 1991 and F 
van Zyl Salbbert and David Welsh, South Africa s Options Strategies for Sharing Power New York St Martin s 
Press 1979
5 African National Congress Harare Declaration 21 October 1989
6 Security Council Resolution 435 29 September 1978
7 For a review of all peacekeeping operations see Alan James Peacekeeping in International Politics London
Macmillan, 1990
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Supervising elections represents a deviation from normal peacekeeping procedures Peacekeepers will be 
assigned duties that are dramatically different from the passive observation roles that have characterized poor 
operations Furthermore peacekeeping forces will not be operating along an identifiable border separating 
combatants but throughout a country in which not even the color of a person s skin will necessarily reveal their 
political loyalty Based on the Namibian precedent8 and the peculiarities of the South African situation and 
ignoring speculation about what specific provisions of a peace agreement might dictate the following is a list 
of likely duties for a U N election supervision force
1 Cease Fire Monitoring—This function is similar to the duties of traditional peacekeeping m 
that the peacekeeping force would be responsible for reporting any acts of violence by political groups 
during the election campaign Unlike traditional forces however peacekeepers in South Africa will be 
stationed throughout the country rather than at a few fixed points along an international border
2 Disengagement o f Military Forces—The peacekeeping force would likely monitor the 
withdrawal of the South African Defense Forces (SADF) from around the country U N troops might 
also monitor agreements that confine the army and any paramilitary groups to their barracks until after 
the election so that they may not be used to intimidate voters A similar provision was included in the 
Namibian agreement
3 Law and Order—The peacekeeping force will be in charge of supervising the law and order 
system until it is turned over to the new government This probably means ensuring that South 
African police perform their legal functions and do not violate the civil rights of the citizenry or 
attempt to influence the election campaign (for example by beating or arresting supporters of the 
ANC) The peacekeeping force will also be concerned with limiting the violence precipitated by 
private groups such as white radicals
4 Verification o f Repeal o f Discriminatory Practices and Release o f Political Prisoners and 
Detainees—The peacekeeping force would be in charge or ensuring that the remaining social and 
political restrictions based on apartheid were eliminated and the new rules guaranteeing equality were 
observed. The forces would also inspect prisons and other locations to ensure that all political 
prisoners or those detained without proper authority of law were released.
5 Return o f Refugees—The peacekeeping force would also ensure that those who fled the country 
for political purposes be allowed to return and take part in the election The repatriation program 
would likely be coordinated with other U N agencies such as the U.N High Commissioner for 
Refugees
6 Establishment o f Election Procedures—Before an election can occur millions of those 
previously disenfranchised must be registered to vote U.N peacekeeping forces must monitor the 
process to insure that those eligible to vote are granted that right and those not eligible are excluded, 
the critical duty is to guarantee that these decisions are made m a nonpartisan fashion For example in 
Namibia, there was a provision that no registration application could be rejected without the approval 
of a UNTAG official
7 Election Supervision—Finally after all the preparatory work, the peacekeeping force would be 
stationed at polling places on election day m order to monitor the fairness of the election U N forces 
would be witness to any irregularities and their presence would serve to deter election day violence If 
the election went smoothly the peacekeeping force could certify the fairness of the process Its task 
completed U.N troops would withdraw after the new government was firmly established and a decent 
interval of time had passed
8 Details on the Namibia peace agreement and the role of the Umted Nations can be found m Robert Jaster The 1988 
Peace Accords and Future of South Western Africa Adelphi Paper 253 London Brassey s 1990 Chester 
Crocker Southern African Peace Making Survival 32 3 (1990) 221 232 and Umted Nations The Blue 
Helmets A Review o f Umted Nations Peacekeeping second edition New York Umted Nations 1990
4In performing these duties the peacekeeping force will be concerned with a variety of groups that may cause 
difficulties Most prominently is the white South African government It may seem odd that the government 
elites would cause difficulties when they are relinquishing power voluntarily and are presumed to support the 
election process Nevertheless this only suggests that the government will not work to destroy the election 
process not that they won t try and manipulate the outcome (much as the South African government did in 
Namibia) One might guess that the peace agreement will guarantee some sort of white representation in the 
new government but whites may still seek to fragment black support and deny the ANC a working majonty 
Thus the peacekeeping force will have to be concerned with actions by the de Klerk government that threaten 
the fairness of the election although it is unlikely the government will take any steps to try and undermine the 
whole peace process The ANC and other black groups will similarly have some incentive to manipulate the 
election outcome although their need, and especially their means to do so is considerably less
A more serious concern to the peacekeeping force might be those groups who oppose the peace agreement 
and whose purpose is not merely to affect the election outcome but to prevent the election from ever taking 
place These groups could include white radicals who oppose the end of apartheid and majonty rule as well as 
black groups that might be excluded (by choice or design) from the peace agreement It is from these groups 
that the greatest threat of widespread violence emanates Thus the peacekeeping force must deal with groups 
that want to maximize political advantage in the election process as well as perhaps those that want to destroy 
the process
Lessons from the Namibian Experience
By most standards the UNTAG operation was a success in that Namibia made the transition to independent 
state and the elections there were free and fair by most accounts Nevertheless the operation did expenence 
several difficulties not the least of which were senous violent incidents The U N peacekeeping expenence m 
Namibia can provide several lessons for what is likely to be a very similar operation m South Africa First, 
UNTAG was the first peacekeeping operation devoted to election supervision and the only one completed as of 
this wnting 9 Thus to a large extent precedent will dictate that future efforts at election supervision will draw 
heavily on the procedures and ideas denved from the Namibian expenence Second a peacekeeping operation in 
South Africa would take place in the same region involve many of the same actors as in Namibia, and the key 
issue of majonty rule is at the centerpiece Of course Namibia was a case of national independence rather than a 
regime change but the parallels relating to geography politics and self determination are strong Third and 
perhaps most importantly the key actors m South Africa regarded the Namibian expenence as a tnal run for 
what will happen in their own country To that extent, the lessons that can be taken from the UNTAG 
expenence will directly condition the behavior of the interested parties Thus there are a set of lessons to be 
taken from the UNTAG operation that must be learned in order to avoid the problems of that operation and to 
facilitate peaceful regime change in South Africa
Size of Peacekeeping Forces
Traditional peacekeeping forces number anywhere from a few hundred to over ten thousand Yet, those troops 
may be m largely stationary positions in a narrow geographic area (often at a border between two states) 
interested only m the movements of defined military units In election supervision the concerns of the 
peacekeeping force are expanded to include the whole population and, formally all prospective polling sites 
The peacekeeping forces are responsible for stabilizing a whole country and the dividing tines between 
opposition groups and individuals are less clear In addition the peacekeeping force assumes many duties (e g 
police and refugee assistance) that are foreign to traditional operations Given such responsibilities a normal 
sized peacekeeping force would seem to be inadequate
9 The United Nations and others have sent observation teams to momtor elections Yet, these differ significantly 
from peacekeeping forces Observation teams are smaller unarmed, deployed just prior to the election, and have 
no direct role in limiting armed conflict in the area of deployment
Despite the increased requirements of the force UNTAG was considerably smaller than the 25 000 or more 
than was thought to be needed Original plans included only 7,500 soldiers and some election personnel Yet 
the Security Council imposed a limit on expenditures that necessitated that the force be reduced to 4 0 0 0 10 The 
small force proved inadequate to supervise the election process m Namibia Namibia has a population of 1 5 
million people throughout a vast territory the size of the United Kingdom and France combined
Problems in Namibia from the small size affected most of the functions that the peacekeeping force was 
supposed to perform The peace agreement specified that the (SADF) and the South West African People s 
Organization (SWAPO) guerrillas would be confined to their bases with weapons being turned over to UNTAG 
Yet the peacekeeping forces had to move from place to place and did not have the manpower to monitor the 
disengagement effectively Into these open pockets there were reports that the SADF continued to operate and 
that they supplied arms to opposition groups H Similarly not all political prisoners were released as specified 
in the peace agreement It was possible to move such prisoners around to various locations in the country 
stay mg several steps ahead of UNTAG and therefore avoiding detection Had the peacekeeping force been larger 
and therefore better able to supervise a bigger area at one time these violations might have been prevented
Peacekeeping operations of all varieties experience problems when they are geographically deployed so as to 
prevent them from fully observing the activities of the protagonists ^  In Namibia the small number of troops 
deployed over a large area could not deter a number of violent clashes between South African and SWAPO 
forces especially in the first weeks of the operation Furthermore the inability to detect South African 
violations assisted that country m its attempt to manipulate the outcome of the election and it also undermined 
support for the operation by the parties involved.
U-N peacekeeping forces cannot afford to organize forces in South Africa as they have done previously in 
Namibia and elsewhere South Africa is 140 000 square miles larger than Namibia with several more 
international borders to monitor (so that irregular forces or illegal voters cannot infiltrate the country) 
Furthermore the South African population is nearly 40 million more than twenty five times the size of 
Namibia, this will necessitate a greater number of polling places and therefore more positions that require 
monitoring on election day The tasks of voter registration and keeping order are also magnified.
There are several approaches to addressing the problems attendant to force size The most obvious is to 
obtain approval from U.N members to supply the necessary number of troops (which could exceed 50 000 or 
100 000) at the time that the operation is authorized. This is a very expensive proposition and there may be 
some reluctance by the permanent Security Council members in particular to bear this burden Yet some 
cost savmg measures as reducing the force size will prove penny wise and pound foolish in the long run if 
widespread violence results Thus a peacekeeping operation in South Africa must plan for the largest force size 
that is politically and financially possible
There are several options that could mitigate the problems of force size should financial or political 
impediments dictate an inadequate force First the peacekeeping force could shift rebanee from the basic foot 
soldier in a jeep to aerial surveillance remote sensors and helicopters This would allow the peacekeeping force 
to cover a greater area with limited manpower Of course this idea depends on the willingness of U N 
members to contribute such forces Furthermore such high technology alternatives are inappropriate to several 
of the peacekeeping tasks such as elecuon registration and supervision
A second option is to call in a special force just pnor to election day in order to monitor the voting 
Election day will be the time that the force will have to be at maximum strength A temporary increase m the 
size of the peacekeeping force might achieve the desired manpower but without the long term cost Such a 
force composed of military units of U N members may be necessary anyway The United Nations is unlikely
10 Security Council Votes to Cut Namibia Force New York Times 17 January 1989 p 4
11 Namibia Rebels Say Pretona is Riggmg November Elections New York Times 11 August 1989 p 6 See also 
Pretoria Spent $35 Million to Influence Namibian Vote New York Times 26 July 1991 p A3
12 Paul Diehl Peacekeeping Operations and the Quest for Peace Political Science Quarterly 103 3 (1988) 485 
507
6to find SO 000 or 100 000 trained peacekeepers for duty especially with the continuation and expansion of 
peacekeeping forces elsewhere Yet one should be hesitant to deploy military forces that have no training or 
experience in peacekeeping philosophy strategy and tactics Allowing them to join the force for one day with 
a specified duty should minimize the chances for a violent incident and yet contribute greatly to the overall 
mission (with a slight cost in organizational coordination)
In summary a peacekeeping force m South Africa must be adequately staffed to meet the new requirements 
of election supervision Judging from the Namibian experience if the United Nations attempts to get by with a 
force of a similar size to UNTAG violence and claims of election manipulation that threaten to unravel the 
whole process are real risks
Composition and Neutrality of the Force
An essential part of U N peacekeeping strategy is that the troops involved be neutral13 In practice this means 
that the troops be drawn from states that do not have an active interest in the conflict at hand and pursue a 
nonaligned foreign policy not surprisingly then the No-die countries have been regular contributors to U N  
peacekeeping operations The forces are also directed not to act m a manner that favors the interests of any 
disputant As an international agency the United Nations is also viewed by the participants as being neutral in 
that the organization has no specific interest in the operation other than promoting international peace and 
security The neutrality of the force is also strongly related to the relative success it has in limiting armed 
conflict14
At first glance it would appear that UNTAG s composition fulfilled the basic requirements for neutrality by 
virtue of its composition the operation included contributions from a cross section of fifty states mostly from 
outside of Africa Nevertheless there was some controversy over the composition and the force s neutrality 
Some in Namibia objected that certain states that contributed troops did not themselves have free elections this 
undermined some erf' the trust that the United Nations had built among the population More importantly 
South Africa did not regard the United Nations as a completely impartial institution in administering the 
election In large part, this was because of the long and bitter relationship that South Africa and the United 
Nations had over Namibia. The United Nations has long denunciations of the policy of apartheid it is not 
surprising that the United Nations was viewed suspiciously by the white government. Perhaps most suggestive 
of a bias the United Nations had recognized one of the parties in the election SWAPO as the authentic 
representative of the Namibian people ”15 Other political parties had some reason therefore to doubt that the 
United Nations had no preference in the outcome of the election
In order for any peacekeeping operation to function effectively it must have the support and trust of the 
participants In Namibia, South Africa virtually regarded the UNTAG troops as agents or symbols of SWAPO 
Not surprisingly South Africa took a number of steps (covertly funding some political parties clashing with 
SWAPO forces and working to undermine the integrity of the election etc ) m part to offset the perceived bias 
of the U N  troops There were even plans although never earned out, to attack U N positions as part of the 
strategy of intimidation and election manipulation16
When the forum moves to South Africa, it is clear that the neutrality of the United Nations could continue 
to be an issue Since 1945 the United Nations has repeatedly condemned South Africa s policy of apartheid. In 
addition the organization suspended the membership pnvileges of the country while granting observer status to 
the African National Congress
How might the United Nations avoid the perception of bias that caused some difficulties in Namibia7 While 
no solution that wipes away fifty years of hostility and mistrust is readily available there arc ways to lessen
13 Richard Nelson, Multinational Peacekeeping in the Middle East and the United Nations Model International 
Affairs 61 1 (1984) 67 89 and Brian Urquhart, Beyond the Sheriff s Posse Survival 32 2 (1990) 196 205
14 Nelson, Multinational Peacekeeping and Diehl Peacekeeping Operations
15 United Nations Namibia A Unique U N  Responsibility New York United Nations 1981
16 New York Times 1 July 1991
fears of U N bias particularly those of white South Africans Traditionally neutral troops have been secured 
by composing the units of soldiers from nonahgned and disinterested states In this instance contributions from 
many Thud World states would be obnoxious to white South Africans One solution is to permit the 
composition of the U.N peacekeeping force to be a subject of negotiation between the indigenous actors This 
would allow any party to veto the participation of soldiers who might be viewed as hostile to its interests
A second and related solution is for the United Nations to structure the force so as to include 
disproportionate contributions from states that do not normally supply peacekeeping forces In this case the 
United States and Great Britain who have mam tamed relatively cordial relationships with South Africa over the 
past few decades might be called upon to organize the bulk of the troops and perhaps play a prominent role in 
the administration of the operation One could also envision excluding contributions from any front line 
states or perhaps any OAU member although the latter may lessen the legitimacy of the peacekeeping force m 
the eyes of black South Africans By making these adjustments m force composition there may be less 
suspicion as to the motives of the troops and fewer disagreements and violence over perceived or real biased 
actions
A third solution and one not exclusive of the other two is to have adequate mechanisms m place for 
dealing with disputes that anse during the course of the operation This mechanism could not only deal with 
questions of neutrality but all varieties of problems that anse during the course of the operation The need for 
such a mechanism is discussed m detail in the next section
The Need for a Dispute Resolution Forum
The conclusion of a peace agreement does not mean the end of conflict between the participants The economic 
and political stakes of the election outcome strongly suggest that there will be disagreements and claims about 
whether some parties are abiding by the letter and spint of the agreement Traditional peacekeeping forces must 
also deal with such disputes this is achieved by informal and formal meetings with the participants to 
investigate complaints and work out differences Yet, traditional operations occupy smaller areas with fewer 
duties and accordingly the opportunity for disagreement is less Election supervision involves monitoring 
activities without any defined lines separating the disputing parties mdeed there is a great deal of interaction 
between all sides The complexity of the process also portends disputes over troop movements voter 
registration and vota* intimidation
The need for a mechanism to resolve any disputes peacefully was not fully recognized in the Namibian 
agreement Among the civilian components of UNTAG was an independent jurist designed to advise on any 
dispute related to the release of political prisoners and detainees17 Yet this covered only one aspect of the peace 
agreement The lack of a formal mechanism for other disputes arising from the implementation of the 
agreement became evident at the outset of the operation
In March 1989 the SADF claimed that SWAPO guerrillas crossed the Angolan border m violation of 
Resolution 435 South Africa desired to conduct retaliation raids against SWAPO forces The peacekeeping 
force initially lacked any way of confirming this claim (although later proven to be correct)18 and there was no 
forum for discussion and facilitating a de-escalation of the crisis without violence After threatening to pull out 
of the agreement South African troops then attacked SWAPO forces in the bloodiest clashes of the pre-election 
period Only after these incidents did the United Nations draw the joint commission of states together to 
stabilize the situation and get the peace process back on track
The attacks at the outset of the peacekeeping operation did not represent the last disputes that arose It 
quickly became clear that South Africa was attempting to manipulate the outcome of the election through 
various covert activities their goal was to deny a two-thirds majority to SWAPO and thereby its ability to wnte 
a constitution unencumbered by the preferences of other parties more sympathetic to South African interests 
SWAPO continually appealed to the United Nations threatening not to recognize the results of the election to
17 United Nations Blue Helmets
18 Carnage as PM Visits Namibia Sunday Telegraph (London) 2 April 1989 p 1
restrain the S ADF from undertaking activities such as intimidating voters and covertly aiding the opposition 
Without an investigative arm to determine the validity of the claims and a mechanism (other than diplomatic 
protests to the South African government) there was little the peacekeeping forces could do
One might easily presume that the disputes and resulting violence that characterized the Namibian operation 
could be repeated m South Africa. As noted above there is an inherent distrust among the various actors m 
South Africa Furthermore the chances for conflict and disagreement would seem to be high given the greater 
number and diversity of political groups The de Klerk government might also use its resources in order to 
bolster the vote of groups such as Inkatha Freedom Party and to minimize the support of the ANC For the 
white government facing the loss of their own power in their own country the stakes are considerably higher 
than m Namibia. There have already been confirmed reports of the government channelling aid to Inkatha and 
less certain claims that the South African police have ignored black-on black violence when the perpetrators 
have been Inkatha and the victims members of the ANC
Before the United Nations repeats its mistakes in Namibia the peacekeeping force must be accompanied by 
an explicit dispute resolution forum This will mclude representatives of the various political groups in South 
Africa and U.N officials Yet there needs to be supplemental bodies m order to ensure that the dispute 
resolution forum operates properly First, there must be an independent investigation team to look into any 
allegations of wrongdoing with respect to any aspect of the agreement Second this effort could be 
supplemented by U N officials corresponding to each of the tasks acting as liaisons to the dispute resolution 
forum Finally it may be necessary contrary to traditional peacekeeping practice to authorize some limited 
enforcement powers to the peacekeeping force in order to ensure that the peace agreement is kept (this 
authorization will be far less than is necessary in any kind of collective security action)
Of course the creation of dispute resolution mechanisms will not head off all disagreements or acts of 
violence They will deter some hostile actions by the parties however as the likelihood of detection and 
embarrassment will be increased. In addition some disputes may be resolved short of the use of military force 
by any actor In these ways the peacekeeping operation can help minimize the loss of life as well as the 
occurrence of actions that may undermine the whole peace process
Limiting the Power of the Government in the Transition Period
Traditional peacekeeping operations freeze the status quo in terms of political power and are not concerned with 
government functions except as they affect the maintenance of a cease fire When peacekeeping troops are 
assigned election supervision duties their scope of concern is broadened considerably In particular the issue of 
what forces will mam tain normal governmental functions such as law and order voter registration and the like 
are critical
The simplest solution is to leave these functions in the hands of the extant government until a new 
government can take its place and reorganize those duties as it desires Yet this solution while convenient and 
efficient on the one hand leaves enormous power in the hands of a particular political group that is a competitor 
in those elections The obvious nsk is that the current government will use its control over the bureaucratic 
machinery in order to manipulate the outcome of the election Most obviously it could achieve that goal 
through its activities in conducting the election and maintaining law and order In the election process the 
government is in charge of registering voters selecting polling sites and managing the election In 
maintaining law and order the police may be one of the few institutions to remain armed during the election 
process and have sweeping powers to arrest and detain alleged criminals Abuses of these responsibilities can 
help achieve political aims Such manipulation was evident in Namibia
The number of UNTAG personnel was insufficient to operate as a police force and indeed, according to 
Secretary General Perez de Cuellar this was not their purpose anyway ^  Thus the South West Africa Police 
effectively controlled by South Africa, retained primary responsibility for law and order Fifteen hundred civilian 
personnel from UNTAG were to monitor the activities of ¿íe police force by nding in patrols with the police
19 Namibia s Independence Process Transafrica Forum, 22 (1990) p 68
officers for example Yet successful monitoring of the police required their cooperation which was not always 
forthcoming especially m the early stages of the operation Disarming the SADF and confining them to their 
bases had little effect as a well armed police force could achieve the same degree of intimidation There w oe 
numerous complaints about police behavior but the peacekeeping force had little ability to investigate or take 
action on those complaints Second the paramilitary group Koevoet, rather than being disbanded was 
integrated into the police force This enhanced the influence of the South African government and increased its 
ability to intimidate potential SWAPO voters Koevoet personnel became as much a major cause of the law and 
order problem with their activities as they contributed to peace and stability as members of the police force 20
The South African government also had an inordinate amount of power in the election process Although 
some safeguards were in place there were some reports of the National Union for the Total Independence of 
Angola (UNITA) members from Angola being recruited and given Namibian citizenship if they promised to vote 
against SWAPO 21 There were fewer problems on election day with several hundred voting sites monitored by 
UNTAG personnel Voter turnout was very high and U.N officials were satisfied that no serious election day 
irregularities occurred.
The problem of maintaining government functions and still ensuring a fair election will be revisited m 
South Africa The de Klerk government presumably cannot be trusted to administer the elections impartially 
given their vital stake in the outcome and past history of funnelling assistance to Inkatha and other groups 
opposed to the ANC Neither can the government be said to run internal security with an even hand considering 
their willingness for example to allow Inkatha members to carry ceremonial” weapons that have been linked 
to attacks on ANC members Furthermore there is some question whether the de Klerk government even has 
full control over the police force 22 Again there will be ample opportunity for white groups to manipulate the 
registration process and intimidate voters through use (or lack of use m some cases) of the local police who do 
the bidding of Pretoria or radical white political groups
Although it is impossible to miUgate the pohucal advantages of the incumbent government in any 
circumstance (they will likely still control or manipulate the media for example) there are some steps that a 
peacekeeping force in South Africa could take First the peacekeeping force could assume a greater role in law 
enforcement than they did in Namibia It is probably unrealistic to expect that the United Nations could (or 
would desire to) assume all the police functions Yet they must play more of a role than passive observers 
One middle option is to integrate U N forces with the South African police at all levels with joint 
administration at the highest levels This permits greater control over the actions of the police as well as some 
mechanism to investigate abuses and take appropriate action in response
Second U.N peacekeeping personnel might take over the bulk of the dubes for registering voters and 
administering the election This may appear to be a violation of sovereignty but prior arrangements which left 
power m the hands of the South African government proved inadequate With these steps the peacekeeping 
force can deter white South African attempts (as well as those of other political groups) to manipulate the 
election The chances of getting caught and causing a scandal will increase These steps will also lessen the 
opportunity for manipulation by removing some control over the process from those likely to misuse the 
power
Cooperation of Subnational Groups
Among the most important ingredients in the success of traditional peacekeeping operations is the cooperation 
of the primary parties and other interested actors in the conflict.23 The absence of that cooperation undermined 
the U N peacekeeping operation in Lebanon (United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon—UNIF1L) as Syria and
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Israel supported various Lebanese factions in opposition to the peacekeeping mandate of limiting violence in the 
area Similarly the Multinational Force (MNF) in Beirut had great problems despite the support of the host 
government of Lebanon various factional militias actively opposed the operation and the civil war m that 
country continued largely unabated. Unless the primary parties and all those with a strong stake m the outcome 
of the peacekeeping process cooperate then patterns of violence are likely to reemerge The whole peace process 
can be undermined if one groups starts a cycle of violence by violating the cease-fire
Although linking the Cuban withdrawal from Angola to progress in Namibian independence had its 
drawbacks it did have the advantage of securing the cooperation of Cuba and Angola in the Namibian peace 
plan Their input not only diminished the likelihood of conflict in Namibia during the elections but in the 
region as a whole Thus a positive lesson from the Namibian experience is the need to secure the support of 
interested third party states Of course the support of South Africa was the cornerstone for the operation and 
many of the problems encountered could be attributed to less than full cooperation by the Pretoria government
Where the Namibian accord was also less than fully successful was m garnering the support of all the 
important indigenous groups Fortunately it was in the interest of most of those groups to back a free election 
supervised by the United Nations Nevertheless SWAPO either misinterpreted the peace accord or deliberately 
sought to circumvent parts of it when their forces crossed the Angolan bender setting off fierce fighting at the 
outset of the pre-election phase ^  Perhaps if SWAPO had been a direct signatory to the accords these 
problems could have been settled by negotiation 25 Other groups such as the aforementioned Koevoet, were not 
formally part of the accord and worked against many of its precepts
Legally only the South African government would need to agree to an election plan before U.N 
peacekeeping troops would be authorized to supervise any elections Practically a successful transition will 
require much broader support U.N sponsored elections in South Africa will probably engender great support 
among African countries and especially the front Ime states Thus many of the external actors most likely to 
scuttle a peacekeeping operation will provide strong backing to the mission
Nevertheless various subnational groups may have reason to sabotage the mission or at least not cooperate 
m all its facets Just as important as government cooperauon is that of the numerous and diverse political 
groups in South Africa On the extreme right, white supremacist groups (such as Blanke Veiligheid or White 
Safety” and the Afrikaner Resistance Movement) have every reason to oppose any plan that will transfer South 
Africa to majority rule Such groups have already been involved in a number of violent actions against blacks 
There is a tendency in the West to assume that the ANC represents the interests and views of all or most blacks 
m South Africa, this perspective ignores the various political and cultural cleavages among the predominant 
racial group m the country The Pan Africanist Congress and the Solidarity Party are just two examples of 
other relevant actors in the political mainstream of the opposition to white rule
With the diversity of interests and political perspectives m South Africa how might the United Nations 
minimize violent acts in opposition to the elections and peacekeeping supervision7 The first step is to ensure 
that the peacekeeping force has more than the support of the de Klerk government If the peacekeeping force is 
viewed as a tool of the regime then it will lack the legitimacy and credibility it needs to act as a neutral arbiter 
m the process (of course one would hope that the United Nations would not authorize a peacekeeping operation 
without such a precondition)
Second and more broadly the peace accord and the subsequent operation of the force should be a product of 
negotiations and agreement among as many significant political groupings as possible An agreement between 
the South African government and the ANC alone runs the nsk of breaking down if Inkatha or other tnbal 
groupings do not cooperate Tnbal or homeland leaders will need to sign on as then assistance will be essential 
in implementing any agreement Of course one might expect that it will be impossible to satisfy some 
groups especially those on the extreme nght wing Yet as long as including vanous groups in the talks does 
not undermine an agreement of some sort between as many groups as possible then there is an advantage to
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consulting all factions m the process and making each a direct signatory to the pact. The ANC has already taken 
steps in this direction by forming a coalition with groups such as the Pan Africanist Congress in talks with the 
de Klerk government.
Third the peacekeeping group could assign a liaison to all political groups in the implementation phase of 
the process This together with the dispute resolution mechanism can help prevent any breakdowns along the 
way Working closely with the subnational actors in South Africa will be necessary to manage the 
disagreements avoid the active opposition and mitigate the mlsunderstandings that are likely to anse between 
all the groups Such actions probably cannot guarantee that support will be universal or that all violence will 
be prevented, but overall success will largely depend on how the United Nations addresses the question of 
subnational actors
Conclusion
Apartheid in South Africa has had broad implications beyond the borders of that country It has been an issue in 
Cold War politics with policy toward South Africa constituting another split between the United States and the 
Soviet Union It has jeopardized regional security by pitting South Africa against its neighbors with resulting 
externally sponsored civil wars and numerous border incursions with bloody results It has also dominated the 
agenda of successive United Nations sessions Yet now the prospects for ending apartheid and turning the 
country over to majority rule are on the horizon We have argued that United Nations peacekeeping forces will 
likely play a central role in supervising the democratic elections that are central to that transition process
When U N  peacekeeping forces assume the role of election supervisors m South Africa, they have the 
potential to usher in two very different scenarios One envisions the election process to be done with minimal 
violence and stable functioning of the government during the transition phase The election will be conducted in 
an even handed fashion with a high turnout The results will be certified as fair by the United Nations and all 
parties One might then look back to the election as a turning point establishing peace security and justice m 
South Africa and perhaps in the region as a whole The second scenano is considerably more pessimistic 
There the pre-election phase is marked by widespread violence among vanous political groups The South 
African government will have done its best to influence the outcome of the election through fraud and 
intimidation The election process will be considered senously flawed, such that several groups will not accept 
the results A civil war will commence following the election to determine control of the government an issue 
that ironically was supposed to be settled peacefully by the election
It is unrealistic to argue that these two extremes are the only scenarios possible for South Africa 
Nevertheless the other scenarios probably fall within the range of the two United Nations peacekeeping will 
have a significant influence on whether the actual outcome is closer to one extreme or the other Based on the 
Namibian experience we have argued that the United Nations must take the following steps to insure a positive 
result (1) send an adequately sized peacekeeping force (2) ensure the neutrality of the force (3) create 
mechanisms to resolve disputes over the operation (4) limit the power of the white government during the 
election process and (5) make efforts to obtain the support of relevant subnational groups These steps may not 
guarantee the success of the U N operation but their absence may represent a lost opportunity to achieve peace 
and stability m the southern cone of Africa
